The Effects of GMO deregulation on Global Food Security and Biotechnological Acceptance by Rodroguez, Alex
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
Dissertations and Theses City College of New York 
2014 
The Effects of GMO deregulation on Global Food Security and 
Biotechnological Acceptance 
Alex Rodroguez 
CUNY City College 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cc_etds_theses/312 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 














Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of 
International Relations at the City College of New York 
 





Table of Contents: 
Abstract         Page 3 
Chapter 1: Introduction       Page 4 
Chapter 2: Literature Review       Page 17 
Chapter 3: Results of Quantitative Analysis     Page 21 
Chapter 4: Results of Qualitative Analysis__________________________Page 68 














  In international relations, political tension has been rising over state deregulation of 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs).  The United States, Argentina, and Brazil have 
been the chief proponents of the global liberalization of GM crops for both trade and 
production, while members of the European Union (EU) have been the strongest opponents 
to GMO proliferation, leading to global trade blocs and fierce discourse with transnational 
entities such as the WTO.  The purpose of this research is to test the primary argument of 
proponents for an empirically significant correlation:  that GMO deregulation has 
significantly contributed to global food security.  Eighteen states are separated into three 
groups based on their level of GMO corn deregulation.  Regression models for Global 
Hunger Index (GHI) for each group are compared to each other for the span between 1990 
and 2013.  These models are also compared with other proposed causal factors to decreasing 
GHI, namely the level of political and civil freedom (Freedom House Score), government 
stability (Political Stability Score from the World Bank Development Research), and GDP 
per capita.  Results from data since 1990 revealed that there is no significant causal 
relationship that can be observed between GMO deregulation and improving food security 
relative to other possible factors, inferring an interaction effect of multiple influences 
irrespective of GMO acceptance.  As the literature indicates, the push to deregulate GMOs by 
certain states underscores their intention not to provide global food security, but to secure 
bio-hegemony in the intellectual property rights and operations of biotechnology within the 
agricultural sector.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The purpose of this research is to explain the relationship between food security concerns and 
the dispute among states on the deregulation of the cultivation and trade of genetically 
modified organisms. Is the international dispute over the deregulation of genetically 
engineered crops a matter of ensuring global food security or preventing biotechnological 
hegemony? Quantitative analysis should illustrate that commercial crop deregulation of 
GMOs (X1) alone will not significantly contribute to global food security.  Multiple 
variables, namely political stability (X2), GDP per capita (X3), and political freedoms (X4) 
can significantly or equally contribute to the access of sufficient food.  Furthermore, based on 
the existing literature, the underlying motive of GMO proliferation is not necessarily food 
security, as proponents would claim, but the struggle for bio-hegemony over the global food 
market.  This literature can be qualitatively pitted against the existing scientific research 
behind the claims of GMO proponents concerning increased yield, higher stress resistance, 
and decreased environmental degradation, justifying or disqualifying resistance against GMO 
deregulation by both developed and lesser developed countries. 
  The editor of the Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, Dr. Richard P . 
Haynes, summarizes the proposed food security solution best: states claim “‘that the world 
needs GM crops to counter future poverty, food deficits, hunger, and climatic changes’” 
(Haynes 2010). Proponent states of GMO proliferation range across various geopolitical and 
economic backgrounds, attesting to the necessity of GMOs as a causal factor toward food 
security (Runge and Senauer 2000).  Among states, there is also considerable resistance 
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against the GMO market, unconvinced of proponents’ claims while emphasizing their own 
wariness of the potential risks of GMOs to food security.  The purpose of this research is to 
analyze state food security measurements relative to the GMO acceptance levels of selected 
states with a focus on corn as a case study.  Any correlation measured that may infer 
causality is set against other possible explanatory variables that have been measured between 
the years of 1990 and 2013.  The results of this study can help guide state policy makers in 
their decisions to support or deny the deregulation of any GM crop variety based on the idea 
that GM crops have been a global contributor to decreased global hunger.   
  Currently, the key players in promoting GMO proliferation are the US, Brazil and 
Argentina (Stone 2010). Today, about 41% of biotech crops in world markets are of US 
origin.  The industry has reportedly brought up to $43.6 billion in additional revenue to the 
USA over 16 years, and $8.8 billion in 2011 (Clives 2012).  The industry is projected to 
increase at 10-15% annually.  Meanwhile, Brazil is currently the second largest plant biotech 
producer in the world and currently exports more agricultural products to the USA than it 
receives from the USA.  Brazil is also the leading exporter of GM soy, corn, and cotton to 
China and the European Union (Silva and O’Kray 2013).  It is also the largest exporter of 
GM soy.  Moreover, Brazil is a growing source of food aid to lesser developed countries 
(LDCs), although it is currently not GM.  In addition to being a key market producer, 
Brazilian production is also a factor in world price controls. Argentina is the third largest 
biotech producer, and has recently opened Chinese markets to its GM corn.  This news 
comes in the mists of tension between China and the US over rejected US corn tainted with 
unapproved GM varieties (Bronstein 2013). 
 The United States, Brazil and Argentina have united in the creation of the 
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international Maize Alliance (MAIZALL).  Although the U.S. Grain Council’s Board of 
Directors may admit that the three countries are in competition to sell similar products, they 
also face similar issues for market access.  MAIZALL coordinates communications for 
lobbying governments to lower regulatory practices against MAIZALL farm products and 
biotechnology (Yankelevich 2013). Although several countries have begun cultivating, 
importing, and exporting GM crops since biotech crops were introduced in 1996, these 
countries face several challenges in the promotion of their products. The main cause of these 
market obstacles is the regulatory practices against GMO crops by economically and 
politically noteworthy countries.   
 The key countries and trading blocs that function as obstacles to GMO proliferation 
are China, Japan, and the European Union. Despite their government’s personal opinion of 
GMOs, LDCs are generally reactionary to the regulatory behavior of these countries.  The 
GMO issue creates a triangular dilemma between GMO proponents, opponents, and potential 
suppliers of GM crops.   
  The key argument among proponent countries of GM crops is that they will help 
provide food for a population that is rapidly growing. Biotechnological corporations could 
purportedly produce the most resilient and nutritious crops for public consumption and 
livestock feed from genetically modify seed varieties. The world appears to be experiencing 
considerable population pressure. Conservative estimates agree that approximately 925 
million people are currently experiencing undernourishment, and the number is expected to 
reach 1 billion by 2025 (Bone and France 2003).  Furthermore, when hunger is not the 
problem, nutritional deficiency poses a greater issue.  More than 3.6 billion people suffer 
from deficiencies in vital nutrients such as iodine, Vitamin A, and iron due to limited variety 
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in diets and the lack of commercial supplements. Increased corporate farming has all but 
decimated natural genetic variety among crops, increasing the vulnerability of populations to 
crop plagues that can wipe out food staples. Furthermore, there is the added dilemma of 
living standard increases affecting global meat consumption. It is expected that developing 
countries will increase their meat and milk consumption by 107 million metric tons and 177 
million metric tons, respectively, by 2020.  To meet the demand of this consumption, 
livestock feed (such as corn and soy) must increase by up to 300 million metric tons by 2020 
(Delgado, Crosson, and Courbois 1997).  As the dietary demands of consumers take priority 
among suppliers, the increased use of chemical pesticides and fertilizers threaten the long-
term sustainability of ecosystems and crop production.  These chemicals have been known to 
cause devastating effects on water and soil quality.  They have also increased concerns 
regarding the increased presence of pesticide-resistant insects and herbicide-resistant weeds. 
Lastly, as desertification increases, arable land for crop production becomes increasingly 
valuable and scarce.  The pursuit of arable land for farming can lead to further decimation of 
vital ecosystems and threaten the peace between states seeking the resources to feed their 
people.   
 According to proponent states, genetically modified organisms can remedy the 
mentioned issues facing population growth and ecological harm.  Genetically modified 
versions of corn, for example, can produce their own pesticide by incorporating bacterial 
genes of the pesticide-producing Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt).  Growing this form of corn can 
drastically reduce the use of chemical pesticides to control for insect infestation (Snow et al. 
2005).  While there are currently no crops that provide their own herbicide, there are 
herbicide-resistant crop varieties that minimize the risk of chemical herbicides destroying the 
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potential harvest.   GM varieties also fuse plant and bacterial genes that allow crops to fight 
fungal and viral diseases, preventing the likelihood of famine-inducing plagues.  As climate 
change expands the desert landscape, GM crops are produced which can tolerate drought and 
the increased exposure to stressors such as salts (Snow et al. 2005). The principal argument 
therefore, is that GM crops are superior to non-GM varieties.  They are able to survive 
infestations and climate changes that could cause serious global repercussions, including the 
extinction of entire crops and debilitating mass starvation.  Furthermore, experimental 
varieties can potentially absorb environmental toxins such as petroleum, allowing for more 
land to be available for farming.   
 Accordingly, states in opposition to GM crops hold a deep skepticism toward the 
proponents’ arguments. They also pose concerns that can allegedly obstruct environmental 
integrity and, of equal if not superior more importance, political power.  Certain studies have 
concluded that pesticide-producing GM crops have led to an increase in Bt-resistant insects.  
Herbicide-resistant GMOs have reportedly led to the increased and more liberal use of 
chemical herbicides on fields (Guruswamy 2002).  Virus-resistance by GM crops has also 
reportedly led to increased resilience in virus species (Snow et al. 2005). 
  If one takes into account the WHO definition of food security, one would know that 
the correlation between GMO acceptance and food security is of relative importance.  The 
primary factor behind a state’s perspective on GMOs is bio-hegemony (Newell 2009).  A 
powerful state will base its decision regarding GMO acceptance on how GM crops may 
affect its sovereignty over food production and trade.  Any state that prefers the status quo of 
the agricultural sector will resist change in order to guard its influence, while states that wish 
to improve their power status will push to institute change (Schneider and Urpelainen 2013).  
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While neoliberals may zealously emphasize the benefits of free market cooperation in the 
agricultural sector, we will see that this perspective masks the realist state’s objective to gain 
more definitive influence over another state’s food supply. One can deduce from policy 
studies that GMO safety field trails and GMO production data are irrelevant in global 
politics.  Nevertheless, there are serious implications regarding the uncontrolled proliferation 
of GMOs on food and state security through a realist perspective.  Bio-tech producing states, 
protecting the intellectual property of GMO transnational entities, can push to open markets 
under neoliberal ideals, securing ownership of this market through the WTO protection of 
biotechnological intellectual property rights.  Although a plant itself can never be considered 
intellectual property, the genes inserted into a GM crop can be patented and protected under 
the law.  Growers of GM crops, respecting IPR, are forbidden to save GM seeds for 
subsequent seasons or to grow GM crops without submitting royalty payments to the owners 
of the patent. If this ownership remains unchallenged, it can seize a state’s autonomous right 
to produce food unregulated by foreign powers.  The state’s ambition to allow uncontrolled 
proliferation of GMO crops will ultimately undermine and threaten food security for 
individual consumer states.  
Defining The Terms Used In This Analysis: 
GMO (Genetically Modified Organism): organisms in which the genetic material (DNA) has 
been altered in a way that does not occur naturally.  The technology is often called “modern 
biotechnology” or “gene technology,” sometimes also “recombinant DNA technology” or 
“genetic engineering.” It allows selected individual genes to be transferred from one 
organism into another, and also between non-related species (World Health Organization 
2013). 
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Commercial crop: Also known as a cash crop: a crop (such as tobacco or cotton) that is 
grown to be sold rather than for use by the farmer (“Cash Crop” 2013). 
Deregulation: The process of removing legal or quasi-legal restrictions on the amount of 
competition, the sorts of business done, or the prices charged within a particular industry 
(The Free Merriam-Webster Dictionary 2013) 
Food Security: when all people at all times have access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to 
maintain a healthy and active life” (Food and Agriculture Organization 2001) 
Dependent Variable 
For the purposes of this research, quantitative analysis of food security will be done through 
the measurements of the International Food Policy Research Institute’s Global Hunger Index 
(GHI). GHI measurements of many states have been taken since 1990.  
Independent Variable  
The potential causative explanatory variable is the level of deregulation for GM maize by 
selected states.  
For the purposes of this study, GM crop laws will be principally observed for GM maize.  
Based on the literature, this crop is the most extensively cultivated and utilized worldwide. 
Maize is also considered a staple crop for most countries around the world, especially the 
countries included in this analysis. Due to these factors, the survival, deregulation, 
acceptance, and proliferation of this crop are of chief concern for food security.  Secondly, 
including other GM crops or all GM products in this study would minimize efficiency, 
creating difficulty in categorizing states that have varied laws on each GMO. Including other 
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GM crops would also decrease the study’s ability to make a strong inference of particular 
GMOs and their effects on food security.  Nevertheless, since maize is a widely used staple 
crop, results from this study can be used to make inferences on the potential effects of other 
GM crops of lesser significance.  
The independent variable is subdivided into 4 groups (Group A, B, C and D) based on a 
state’s level of GMO deregulation. The groups are categorized as follows: 
A. In these countries, GM maize has been officially banned for cultivation and import of 
products containing GM maize. In this group, virtually all GM products have been 
outlawed as well. 
B. GM maize has been forbidden for cultivation, but imports are allowed (officially or 
unofficially). 
C. GM maize may be cultivated for commercialization as well as imported. In this 
group, several, if not all, GM products may be introduced into the country for 
cultivation or commercial consumption. 
D. A randomly selected sample of 29 countries that will undergo the same quantitative 
analysis as Group A, B, and C.   
Confounding Variables 
The following variables potentially confound the results of this study, and various controls 
have been instituted in order to provide for the most thorough analysis: 
1. GMO import acceptance is a greater causal factor in the decrease of a state’s GHI 
than cultivation.  
Control:  To analyze whether import acceptance is significantly different to an import 
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ban, the regression analysis between Import Accepting Countries (Group B) and 
Import Ban countries (Group A) will be compared for a statistically significant 
difference in correlation.   
2.  Interaction Effect: GMO cultivation and import acceptance are both necessary for a 
significant decrease in GHI when compared to a complete GMO ban or the mere 
acceptance of imports.  
Control: Similar to the control for first confounding variable, Group C states will 
undergo a regression analysis that will compare with Group B and A countries for a 
greater correlation. 
3.  Reverse Causality – Increased food security leads to GMO deregulation, possibly 
because countries with low GHI are less wary of the potential effects of GM crops on 
environmental degradation or the loss of crop diversity.    
Control:  GMO deregulation is highly contested in states that are already highly food 
secure, namely the states of the European Union. A literature review regarding these 
states will serve as a control as we assess why several EU states have shown stern 
resistance against GMO cash crops and imports based on the existing research on GM 
crop yields and environmental impact.  
4.  Increased civil liberties is the principal cause of food security. 
Control:  This idea necessitates separate analysis. Using the Freedom House Score 
(FHS) as the explanatory variable for GHI, each group will undergo comparative 
regression analyses.  The FHS will be converted numerically into 1 (Free), 2 
(partially free), and 3 (Not Free) for each measured year of GHI of that state. The 
resulting scatter plots and regression analysis for each state and group will be 
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compared with the ones obtained from the initial test series (explained under 
Procedure).   
5. Increased political stability leads to food security.    
Control:  This possible confounding variable necessitates separate tests comparing 
regression scores for statistical significance.  The Political Stability Score (PSS) from 
the World Bank Development Research will serve as the potential explanatory 
valuable for decrease in GHI. The PSS for each country of each group will be set 
against its most closely corresponding GHI.  The regression analyses gathered will be 
tested with the ones obtained from the initial test (explained under Procedure).   
6. GDP per capita is an extraneous variable significantly contributing to food security. 
Control: As with 4 and 5, GDP for corresponding GHI years of each state will allow 
for analysis. 
7. Traditional and non-GMO farming methods are sufficient to sustain for food security.  
Control:  Group A serves as a test for this hypothesis.  If regression models show that 
each state’s GHI decreases over time without GMO deregulation when compared 
with Group B and C states, then status quo farming methods may suffice for ensuring 
food security despite population growth.  
Cases 
Initially, 18 countries will be measured for a relationship between GHI and GMO 
deregulation, and this is liable to expansion, especially for the list of Group B countries in an 
effort to improve accuracy.  
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Group A – Based on the most current literature, there are only 6 countries with official GMO 
bans for cultivation and import (Serbia is excluded from the study due to lack of GHI 
measurements). This group serves as the primary control group that can most closely 
represent the null hypothesis.  The states in this group are: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Turkey, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
Group B – Many countries fall under this category, either officially or otherwise, but for the 
purposes of this study, I include states that a) are considered lesser developed or developing 
b) are under pressure by neighbors to cultivate and accept more GMO crops c) have 
measurable changes in GHI since 1990 (measurements above 5), and d) import corn.  These 
states are: Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela. 
Group C– As with Group A countries, there are relatively few countries that officially allow 
GMO corn for commercial cultivation and importation. The only state excluded from this list 
is the United States, since GHI scores are not on record.  These states are: Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Honduras, and Uruguay. 
Group D – As a second statistical control and to minimize any suspicion of bias, a random 
sample of 29 countries will be drawn to undergo the procedure of this research for overall 
comparative purposes. The countries randomly selected are:  Chad, Swaziland, India, 
Albania, Mozambique, Cuba, Philippines, Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen, Laos, Ecuador, 
Nigeria, Ethiopia, Panama, Bolivia, Sri Lanka, North Korea, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Peru, 
Guyana, Nepal, Niger, Namibia, Morocco, Mongolia, South Africa, Sierre Leone, and 
Thailand. 
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Note: Western European countries were completely excluded from this study for a few 
reasons.  Most western European countries never had a measurable GHI changes from 1990 
to 2013. The GHI of western European countries were often not even measured. 
Procedure  
The Initial Test Series (ITS):  
Analysis will begin with Group A, our control group. There will be scatter plot graphs 
created for each state and their relative GHI from the period 1990 to 2013. Using Microsoft 
Excel, a regression analysis will test for the correlation coefficient and r2 within each model 
for each state.  The mean r2 will be calculated for group comparative purposes of relative 
variance and overall reliability of their models.  This procedure will be repeated for the states 
of Group B, C, and D.  
The calculated mean r2 will serve to objectively deduce if either group produces a more 
affective model of decreasing GHI over time.  
The Initial Test Series is followed by subsequent tests to rule out or support the effects of 
measurable confounding variables: the Political Stability Score (PSS) and Freedom House 
Score (FHS). 
Political Stability Score (PSS):  
For each group, the PSS is found which corresponds closest to the GHI for each country in 
1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2013. The results are described on scatter plot graphs with their 
regression models, correlation coefficients, and corresponding r2 . The resulting individual 
state r2 and correlation coefficients will be compared to its r2 and correlation coefficients 
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found in the ITS. The mean correlation of determination for each group is also compared 
with the results from other groups of the same analysis. 
Freedom House Score (FHS):   
For each group states, the FHS is found by taking the average for each state’s civil liberties 
(CL) and political rights (PR) scores.  The scores used are the ones that correspond closest to 
the GHI of each country in 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2013. Results for the FHS will be 
labeled with the following scale: Free = 1 to 2.5, Partially Free  = 3 to 5, Not Free = 5.5 to 7 
The results are described on scatter plot graphs with each state’s regression line, correlation 
coefficients, and corresponding r2 . The resulting r2 and correlation coefficients for each state 
is compared with the results found in the ITS. The mean r2 of each group is also compared 
with other groups of the same analysis.  
GDP per Capita:  
For each group, the GDP per capita is found which best corresponds with the GHI of each 
country in 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2013. The results are described on scatter plot graphs 
with each state’s regression line, correlation coefficients, and corresponding r2 . The resulting 
r2 and correlation coefficients for each state is compared with the results found in the ITS. 
The mean r2 of each group is also compared with other groups of the same analysis. 
Qualitative Analysis: 
After assessing the results from quantitative research, it is necessary to qualitatively review 
each country for correlations between the data and the literature that may relate to the 
historical, political, economical, and ecological reasons for changes in GHI and overall food 
security.    
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 Scholars in global economics, international relations, anthropology, biology, the 
humanities and various interdisciplinary studies have delved into the potential benefits and 
harm associated with the deregulation of genetically modified organisms for the production 
of food and livestock feed.  Research indicates that the trade of GMOs has led to a shift in 
trading patterns, international tensions, and alliances.   The cause of this shift is due to 
varying opinions of GMOs and their impact on food security. Meanwhile, there is also the 
alternative perspective of GMOs being a tool to secure biotechnological hegemony (bio-
hegemony) rather than food security. When one considers the competitiveness of the 
agricultural sector, states hoping to increase their political influence will push for changes in 
favor of their markets, and states satisfied with their status will fight to preserve the status 
quo. 
  According to Nielsen and Anderson (Nielsen and Anderson 2001), the market for 
genetically modified organisms has led to the analysis of shifting trade patterns, mainly 
between GMO producers, the European Union, and several lesser developed states that vary 
their regulatory policies based on the demands of large importers of agriculture.  Although 
the EU has approved every request to authorize GMO imports and usage for member states, 
Kurzer and Cooper (Kurzer and Cooper 2007) contend that consumers and member state 
policymakers have been relatively unwavering in their resolve to limit or eliminate their 
exposure to GM products, even as the expense of this endeavor rises.  According to Falkner 
(Falkner 2000), the cause of this struggle to pry open the agricultural gates of EU member 
states has been tied to alleged biosafety and food security issues posed by both proponent and 
opponent states.  Furthermore, Kurzer and Cooper (Kurzer and Cooper 2007) point out that 
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there is a growing distrust by wary states regarding the favorable claims of GMOs by 
proponent states, multinational corporations, and even academia.  Noussair, Robin, and 
Ruffieux (2004) summarize the claims by proponent states, which include the increased 
yield, higher resilience under stressful conditions, and decreased environmental degradation 
associated with the use of genetically modified crops.  If true, genetically modified crops 
would be strategically superior in ensuring global food security as populations rise and arable 
land decreases.   
  Falkner (Falkner 2000) asserts that resistance by EU member states to accept GMO 
approval, citing the precautionary principle of the Cartagena Protocol to secure the legality of 
this resistance, has been the primary stimulus to polarize states and prompt trade disputes 
between developed and lesser developed countries.  Clapp (Clapp 2005) points out that states 
across southern Africa, wary of lax monitoring of agriculture in the US, have refused food 
aid that may contain GMOs unless it has been fully processed, fearing that GM food aid can 
contaminate their agriculture, which would consequently disrupt trade relations with 
European states.  Alluding to food security fears, McAfee (McAfee 2003) highlights how 
cross-contamination of GM corn into non-GMO fields in Oaxaca, Mexico has backed 
suspicions that producer states of GM crops are not concerned with the preservation of local 
varieties in the interest of food security.  Nevertheless, the US, Brazil and Argentina, among 
others, continue to assert that genetically modified crops pose no threat to non-GM varieties.  
As observed by Qvist et al.(Qvist, Lundsgaard, and Brandt 2006), there have been wide-
ranging hopes that GM crop usage would decrease the use of harmful agricultural inputs. 
Chhakchhuak (Chhakchhuak 2005) has assessed and summarized cases that strongly suggest 
the use of biotech crops have substantially reduced chemical pesticides, notably reported in 
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Indian cotton. Nevertheless, through the use of GM crops, Pimentel (Pimentel 2001) has 
noted that states have witnessed the increased use of pesticides and herbicides due to growing 
pest and weed resistance. They have also witnessed that the standardization methods of 
corporate farming tactics, through the use of GM crops, have led to the elimination and 
endangerment of local varieties.  The loss of local crop varieties, according to states opposing 
GMOs, implicates the loss of vital genes that could save crop yields in the event of 
devastating famines.  Meanwhile, according to Halfon (Halfon 2010), states and transnational 
organizations, including the WTO and EU, in favor of deregulation, have cited there is no 
“significant scientific uncertainty” to justify a complete ban of any GMO crop.  The WTO, in 
fact, has demanded that EU and non-EU states lift moratoriums and import bans, claiming 
that their attempts to prevent trade of GMOs undermines the liberal ideals of WTO 
membership while imposing protectionist policies to preserve the status of their agricultural 
sector. 
  While disputes over the merits of GM crops are paradoxical and politicized, an 
additional fear behind GMO proliferation is the collection of royalties for intellectual 
property rights. Coleman and Gabler (Coleman and Gabler 2002) mention that the WTO has 
agreed to support the rights of a state’s multinational corporations to collect fees and 
licensing agreements for the distribution, use, and sale of any of their GM seed and crop 
varieties. Scholars have questioned if GMO deregulation is really a matter of food security, 
or if states such as Argentina, Brazil, and the United States have goals of securing bio-
hegemony in the agricultural sector. These principal GMO-producing countries, according to 
Newell (Newell 2009), have been known to collaborate in prying open markets while 
simultaneously competing for the most lucrative trade agreements.  Meanwhile, as Munson 
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(Munson 1993) points out, states fear that subjecting their food production to intellectual 
property rights would eventually become an obstacle for their long-term food sovereignty 
and security. Contrary to proponents’ claims on the link between GMO deregulation and 
food security, Tweeten (Tweeten 1999) upholds the long-standing theory that has been the 
interaction effect of various factors, such as economic equity and efficiency in land use 














Chapter 3: Results of Quantitative Analysis 
Groups and their corresponding correlation coefficient and p-value were measured for each 
variable.  
For Group A, Group B, and Group C, data were collected for GHI and organized as follows 
(Fig. 1): 
GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX           
http://www.ifpri.org/book-
8018/node/8058           
Import and Cultivation Ban 
Countries and their GHI (Group 
A):           
  1990 1995 2000 2005 2012 
Algeria 7 7.7 5.3 5 5 
Angola 39.5 38.5 31.6 22.7 19.1 
Benin 22.5 20.5 17.3 15.2 13.3 
Turkey 5 5 5 5 5 
Zambia 24.9 24.5 26.3 25.3 24.1 
Zimbabwe 20 22 21.7 20.5 16.5 
            
No Cultivation but allows GM 
imports (Group B)           
  1990 1995 2000 2005 2012 
Ecuador 14 11.6 12.3 10.1 8.5 
El Salvador 10.9 8.7 7.4 6.4 6.8 
Guatemala 15 16.1 17 17 15.5 
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Nicaragua 24.1 19.9 15.4 11.5 9.5 
Peru 16.3 12.3 10.5 9.9 5.5 
Venezuela 7.8 7.7 7.2 5.2 5 
            
Import and Cultivation (Group 
C)           
  1990 1995 2000 2005 2012 
Argentina 5 5 5 5 5 
Brazil 8.7 7.6 6.4 5 5 
Chile 5 5 5 5 5 
Colombia 10.4 8 6.8 6.9 5.9 
Honduras 14.2 13.6 10.8 8.5 7.9 
Uruguay 5.5 5 5 5 5 
Figure 1.1: GHI data for Group A, B, and C for years measured. The lowest score is a 5, 
signifying virtually no serious hunger issues in the country.  Higher numbers indicated 
progressively more serious problems related to hunger and food security in the country. 
Separate charts were created for each group pertaining to FHS (Fig 1.2), PSS (Fig. 1.3), and 
GDP per Capita (Fig 1.4): 
Freedom House 
Score           
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-
types/freedom-world           
Import and Cultivation Ban Countries 
and their Freedom House Score           
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  1990 1995 2000 2005 2012 
Algeria 4 6 5.5 5.5 5.5 
Angola 7 6 6 5.5 5.5 
Benin 5 2 2 2 2 
Turkey 3 5 4.5 3 3.5 
Zambia 5.5 3.5 4.5 4 3.5 
Zimbabwe 5 5 5.5 6.5 6 
            
            
No Cultivation but allows GM imports           
  1990 1995 2000 2005 2012 
Ecuador 2 2.5 3 3 3 
El Salvador 3.5 3 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Guatemala 3.5 4.5 3.5 4 3.5 
Nicaragua 3 4 3 3 4.5 
Peru 3.5 4.5 3.5 2.5 2.5 
Venezuela 2 3 4 4 5 
            
            
Import and Cultivation           
  1990 1995 2000 2005 2012 
Argentina 2 2.5 1.5 2 2 
Brazil 2.5 3 3 2 2 
Chile 2 2 2 1 1 
Colombia 3.5 4 4 3 3.5 
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Honduras 2.5 3 3 3 4 
Uruguay 1.5 2 1 1 1 
Figure 1.2: Data summary of Group A, B, and C regarding Freedom House Score for years 
measured. Free states are rated between 1 and 2.5.  Partially free states are rated between 3 
and 5. States that are considered “not free” range between 5.5 and 7.  
Political Stability Score         
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home         
Import and Cultivation Ban Countries and their 
Political Stability Score         
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Import and Cultivation         
  1996 2000 2005 2012



























Uruguay 0.53 0.85 0.79 0.71
Figure 1.3: Data summary of Group A, B, and C regarding Political Stability Score for years 
measured. Negative scores deem the country’s political atmosphere as generally unstable, 
while progressively more positive scores rate the country more toward political stability. 
GDP PER CAPITA           
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD           
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Import and Cultivation Ban Countries and their 
GDP per Capita:           
  1990 1995 2000 2005 2012
Algeria 2365 1425 1727 3039 5310
Angola 993 416 656 1707 5539
Benin 392 362 339 533 751
Turkey 2791 2896 4220 7130 10661
Zambia 419 393 322 626 1463
Zimbabwe 840 611 535 453 909
            
            
            
No Cultivation but allows GM imports           
  1990 1995 2000 2005 2012
Ecuador 1505 2159 1462 3013 5425
El Salvador 898 1653 2204 2815 3782
Guatemala 860 1468 1722 2146 3341
Nicaragua 244 889 1001 1159 1777
Peru 1149 2132 1949 2675 6424
Venezuela 2382 3390 4800 5445 12729
            
            
            
Import and Cultivation           
  1990 1995 2000 2005 2012
Argentina 4333 8973 9329 5768 14680
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Brazil 3087 4750 3694 4739 11320
Chile 2388 4941 5133 7615 15245
Colombia 1209 2529 2504 3393 7763
Honduras 622 699 1140 1402 2339
Uruguay 2990 5985 6873 5222 14728
Figure 1.4: Data summary of Group A, B, and C regarding GDP per Capita for years 
measured (in USD).  
Each group went through a regression analysis where the dependent variable (GHI) was 
pitted against the potential independent variables. 
Figure 1.5: Regression Analysis for Group A of Time determining GHI. A total of 30 
observations of GHI changing over time yielded low correlation values for the x-variable 
(time) and statistically insignificant p-value for regression analysis at the 95% and 99% 
confidence interval: 
SUMMARY 
OUTPUT Group A        
         
Regression 
Statistics        
Multiple R 0.23        
R Square 0.05        
Adjusted R 
Square 0.02        
Standard 
Error 10.08        
Observatio
30.00        
  28
ns 
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significan
ce F    
Regression 1.00 156.02
156.0





2      
Total 29.00 
2998.4
7          

























1 -0.30 0.24 -1.24 0.23 -0.79 0.19 -0.79 0.19
 
Figure 1.6: Regression Analysis for Group B of Time determining GHI. A total of 30 
observations of GHI changing over time yielded medium-low correlation values for the x-
variable (time) and a statistically significant p-value from the regression analysis at the 99% 
confidence interval: 
SUMMARY 
OUTPUT GROUP B        
         
Regression 
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Statistics 
Multiple R 0.46        
R Square 0.21        
Adjusted R 
Square 0.19        
Standard 
Error 4.24        
Observations 30.00        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F    
Regression 1.00 136.73 136.73 7.59 0.01    
Residual 28.00 504.48 18.02      
Total 29.00 641.21          
         
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat 
P-







Intercept 569.19 202.44 2.81 0.01 154.50 983.88 154.50 983.88
X Variable 1 -0.28 0.10 -2.75 0.01 -0.49 -0.07 -0.49 -0.07
 
Figure 1.7: Regression Analysis for Group C of Time determining GHI. A total of 30 
observations of GHI changing over time yielded fairly low correlation values for the x-




       
  30
GROUP C 
         
Regression 
Statistics        
Multiple R 0.35        
R Square 0.13        
Adjusted R 
Square 0.09        
Standard Error 2.46        
Observations 30.00        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significan
ce F    
Regression 1.00 24.33
24.3
3 4.01 0.05    
Residual 28.00 169.67 6.06      
Total 29.00 194.00          
























X Variable 1 -0.12 0.06
-
2.00 0.05 -0.24 0.00 -0.24 0.00
 
Figure 1.8: Regression Analysis for Group A of FHS determining GHI. A total of 30 
observations of GHI changing over time yielded low correlation values for the x-variable 
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(FHS) and a statistically insignificant p-value from the regression analysis at the 95% and 





House Score      
         
Regression 
Statistics        
Multiple R 0.30        
R Square 0.09        
Adjusted R 
Square 0.06        
Standard 
Error 9.88        
Observatio
ns 30.00        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significan
ce F    
Regression 1.00 263.30
263.3
0 2.70 0.11    
Residual 28.00 
2735.1
7 97.68      
Total 29.00 
2998.4
7          
         
  Coefficients 
Standar























1 2.09 1.28 1.64 0.11 -0.52 4.71 -0.52 4.71
 
Figure 1.9: Regression Analysis for Group B of FHS determining GHI. A total of 30 
observations of GHI changing over time yielded low correlation values for the x-variable 
(FHS) and a statistically insignificant p-value from the regression analysis at the 95% and 





House Score       
         
Regression 
Statistics        
Multiple R 0.15        
R Square 0.02        
Adjusted R 
Square -0.01        
Standard 
Error 4.73        
Observatio
ns 30.00        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significan




3 0.61 0.44    
Residual 28.00 627.58
22.4
1      
Total 29.00 641.21          
         

















Intercept 8.59 3.83 2.24 0.03 0.74 16.44 0.74 16.44
X Variable 
1 0.89 1.14 0.78 0.44 -1.44 3.22 -1.44 3.22
 
Figure 2.0: Regression Analysis for Group C of FHS determining GHI. A total of 30 
observations of GHI changing over time yielded medium correlation values for the x-variable 
(FHS) and a statistically significant p-value from the regression analysis at the 95% and 99% 






Score     
         
Regression 
Statistics        
Multiple R 0.53        
R Square 0.28        
Adjusted R 
Square 0.25        
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Standard 
Error 2.23        
Observations 30.00        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F    
Regression 1.00 54.39 54.39 10.91 0.00    
Residual 28.00 139.61 4.99      
Total 29.00 194.00          
         
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat 
P-







Intercept 3.25 1.12 2.89 0.01 0.94 5.55 0.94 5.55
X Variable 1 1.47 0.45 3.30 0.00 0.56 2.39 0.56 2.39
 
Figure 2.1: Regression Analysis for Group A of PSS determining GHI. A total of 24 
observations of GHI changing over time yielded low correlation values for the x-variable 
(PSS) and a statistically insignificant p-value from the regression analysis at the 95% and 






Score     
         
Regression 
Statistics        
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Multiple R 0.07        
R Square 0.01        
Adjusted R 
Square -0.04        
Standard 
Error 9.86        
Observatio
ns 24.00        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significanc
e F    
Regression 1.00 11.66
11.6
6 0.12 0.73    
Residual 22.00 2137.48
97.1
6      
Total 23.00 2149.14          
         





















Intercept 17.30 2.55 6.79 0.00 12.01 22.58 12.01 22.58
X Variable 
1 0.80 2.32 0.35 0.73 -4.01 5.62 -4.01 5.62
 
Figure 2.2: Regression Analysis for Group B of PSS determining GHI. A total of 24 
observations of GHI changing over time yielded low correlation values for the x-variable 
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(PSS) and a statistically significant p-value from the regression analysis at the 95% 






Score     
         
Regression 
Statistics        
Multiple R 0.14        
R Square 0.02        
Adjusted R 
Square -0.02        
Standard 
Error 4.28        
Observations 24.00        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F    
Regression 1.00 8.49 8.49 0.46 0.50    
Residual 22.00 403.33 18.33      
Total 23.00 411.82          
         
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat 
P-







Intercept 9.76 1.64 5.95 0.00 6.36 13.16 6.36 13.16
X Variable 1 -1.48 2.17 -0.68 0.50 -5.98 3.03 -5.98 3.03
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Figure 2.3: Regression Analysis for Group C of PSS determining GHI. A total of 24 
observations of GHI changing over time yielded medium correlation values for the x-variable 
(PSS) and a statistically significant p-value from the regression analysis at the 95% 






Score     
         
Regression 
Statistics        
Multiple R 0.44        
R Square 0.19        
Adjusted R 
Square 0.15        
Standard 
Error 2.01        
Observations 24.00        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F    
Regression 1.00 21.02 21.02 5.20 0.03    
Residual 22.00 88.88 4.04      
Total 23.00 109.90          
         
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat 
P-








Intercept 6.18 0.42 14.83 0.00 5.32 7.05 5.32 7.05
X Variable 1 -1.17 0.51 -2.28 0.03 -2.23 -0.11 -2.23 -0.11
 
Figure 2.4: Regression Analysis for Group A of GDP per Capita determining GHI. A total of 
30 observations of GHI changing over time yielded medium correlation values for the x-
variable (GDP per Capita) and a statistically significant p-value from the regression analysis 
at the 95% and 99% confidence intervals.  
SUMMARY 
OUTPUT        
         
Regression 
Statistics        
Multiple R 0.58        
R Square 0.34        
Adjusted R 
Square 0.32        
Standard 
Error 8.40        
Observations 30.00        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F    
Regression 1.00 1021.63 1021.63 14.47 0.00    
Residual 28.00 1976.84 70.60      
Total 29.00 2998.47          
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  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat 
P-







Intercept 22.27 2.00 11.11 0.00 18.17 26.37 18.17 26.37
X Variable 1 0.00 0.00 -3.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 
Figure 2.5: Regression Analysis for Group B of GDP per Capita determining GHI. A total of 
30 observations of GHI changing over time yielded medium correlation values for the x-
variable (GDP per Capita) and a statistically significant p-value from the regression analysis 
at the 95% and 99% confidence intervals.  
 
SUMMARY 
OUTPUT        
         
Regression 
Statistics        
Multiple R 0.62        
R Square 0.38        
Adjusted R 
Square 0.36        
Standard 
Error 3.76        
Observations 30.00        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significan





6 17.39 0.00    
Residual 28.00 395.55 14.13      
Total 29.00 641.21          




















Intercept 14.83 1.05 14.10 0.00 12.67 16.98 12.67 16.98
X Variable 1 0.00 0.00 -4.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 
 
Figure 2.6: Regression Analysis for Group C of GDP per Capita determining GHI. A total of 
30 observations of GHI changing over time yielded moderate correlation values for the x-
variable (GDP per Capita) and a statistically significant p-value from the regression analysis 
at the 95% and 99% confidence intervals.  
 
SUMMARY 
OUTPUT        
         
Regression 
Statistics        
Multiple R 0.61        
R Square 0.37        
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Adjusted R 
Square 0.35        
Standard 
Error 2.09        
Observations 30.00        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significanc
e F    
Regression 1.00 72.27
72.2
7 16.62 0.00    
Residual 28.00 121.73 4.35      
Total 29.00 194.00          
























5 0.00 7.49 10.12 7.49 10.12
X Variable 1 0.00 0.00
-
4.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 
The random sample of 27 countries were organized in a similar fashion for data collection. 
Initially, data were collected pertaining to GHI (Figure 2.7): 
Random Sample     Time and GHI   
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2012 
Chad 38.8 34.9 29.8 29.7 26.9 
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Swaziland 10.4 12.9 12.7 12.5 14.4 
India 32.6 27.1 24.8 24.0 21.3 
Albania 9.2 6.0 7.8 6.1 5.2 
Mozambique 36.0 32.0 28.5 25.1 21.5 
Cuba 5.5 7.4 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Philippines 19.9 17.4 17.7 14.0 13.2 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
7.7 6.1 5.0 5.1 5.0 
Yemen 29.8 27.7 26.9 27.9 26.5 
Laos 33.4 30.3 28.0 23.7 18.7 
Nigeria 25.3 22.6 17.9 16.3 15.0 
Ethiopia 42.3 42.7 37.1 31.0 25.7 
Panama 11.6 10.8 11.4 9.0 5.4 
Bolivia 18.8 16.9 14.2 13.8 11.2 
Sri Lanka 22.3  20.7  17.8  16.9  15.6 
North Korea 18.8 22.6 22.5 20.0 18.0 
Cambodia 32.2  30.7  27.8  20.9  16.8 
Bangladesh 36.7  35.1  24.0  20.2  19.4 
Guyana 14.3 10.2 8.2 8.0 6.6 
Nepal 28.0 27.3 25.3 22.3 17.3 
Niger 36.4  34.6  30.3  25.6  20.3 
Namibia 22.1 21.9 17.5 17.1 18.4 
Morocco 7.8  6.9  6.2  6.5  5.0 
Mongolia 19.7 23.6 18.5 14.1 10.8 
South Africa 7.2 6.5 7.4 7.7 5.4 
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Sierre Leone 31.3 29.5 30.0 28.4 22.8 
Thailand 21.3 17.1 10.2 6.6 5.8 
Figure 2.7: Data collection of GHI over a period time measured.  
If possible, the corresponding year for GHI for each country was set against a FHS, PSS, and 
GDP per capita for each country. When there was no data, the country was eliminated from 
the regression analysis.  For PSS, 1996 data was used as a substitute for 1995 since it was the 
earliest data available (Figure 2.8).  
Random Sample     FHS     
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2012 
Chad 6.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 6.5 
Swaziland 5.5 5.5 5.5 6.0 6.0 
India 2.5 4.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Albania 6.5 3.5 4.5 3.0 3.0 
Mozambique 6.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Cuba 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.5 





7.0 7.0 7.0 
Yemen 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.0 6.0 
Laos 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 
Nigeria 5.0 7.0 4.0 4.0 4.5 
Ethiopia 7.0 4.5 5.0 5.0 6.0 
Panama 3.0 2.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Bolivia 2.5 3.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 
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Sri Lanka 4.5 4.5 3.5 3.0 4.5 
North Korea 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 
Cambodia 7.0 6.0 6.0 5.5 5.5 
Bangladesh 5.0 3.5 3.5 4.0 3.5 
Guyana 4.5 2.0 2.0 3.0 2.5 
Nepal 4.0 3.5 3.5 5.5 4.0 
Niger 5.5 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.5 
Namibia 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.0 2.0 
Morocco 4.0 5.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Mongolia 4.0 5.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 
South Africa 4.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.0 
Sierre Leone 5.5 6.5 4.5 3.5 2.5 
Thailand 2.5 3.5 2.5 3.0 4.0 
Figure 2.8: Data collection summary of PSS coinciding to the closest available GHI 
measurement for a given year. 
 GDP per Capita    
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2012 
Chad 292 207 167 664 1035 
Swaziland 1292 1763 1433 2339 3290 
India 376 384 457 740 1503 
Albania 639 761 1193 2799 4406 
Mozambique 185 141 236 313 570 
Cuba 2702 2783 2744 3776  




989 795 1180 1589 
 
Yemen 479 284 550 832 1341 
Laos 204 362 321 472 1412 
Nigeria 322 263 164 804 2722 
Ethiopia 249 132 123 160 467 
Panama 2137 2868 3804 4594 9982 
Bolivia 716 879 989 1021 2576 
Sri Lanka 415 718 855 1242 2922 
North Korea      
Cambodia  320 299 471 945 
Bangladesh 281 317 356 421 750 
Guyana 547 854 957 1084 3585 
Nepal 200 214 237 321 699 
Niger 320 205 164 258 395 
Namibia 1981 2383 2059 3582 5931 
Morocco 1037 1218 1276 1948 2902 
Mongolia 1172 632 474 999 3691 
South Africa 3182 3863 3020 5186 7314 
Sierre Leone 161 222 154 318 633 
Thailand 1508 2849 1969 2690 5480 
Figure 2.9: Data collection summary of GDP per Capita for randomly selected countries 
(numbers in USD).  
Afterwards, a regression analysis was undertaken in order to determine statistical 
significance for each model: 
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Regression Analysis for Group D of Time determining GHI (Figure 3.0): 
SUMMARY 
OUTPUT        
         
Regression 
Statistics        
Multiple R 0.31        
R Square 0.09        
Adjusted R 
Square 0.09        
Standard Error 9.34        
Observations 135.00        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F    
Regression 1.00 1194.31 1194.31 13.69 0.00    
Residual 133.00 11602.01 87.23      
Total 134.00 12796.32          
         
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat 
P-







Intercept 796.01 209.99 3.79 0.00 380.66 1211.36 380.66 1211.3
X Variable 1 -0.39 0.10 -3.70 0.00 -0.60 -0.18 -0.60 -0.1
Figure 3.0: Regression analysis summary of a random sample Group D of GHI and Time (the 
ITS). 135 observations yielded moderate correlation values with a regression analysis 
statistic of the x-value (time) that measured statistically significant at the 95% and 99% 
confidence intervals. 
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Regression Analysis for Group D of FHS determining GHI (Figure 3.1): 
SUMMARY 
OUTPUT        
         
Regression 
Statistics        
Multiple R 0.20        
R Square 0.04        
Adjusted R 
Square 0.03        
Standard 
Error 9.62        
Observations 135.00        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significan
ce F    
Regression 1.00 495.67 
495.6
7 5.36 0.02    
Residual 133.00 
12300.6
5 92.49      
Total 134.00 
12796.3
2          





















Intercept 13.93 2.35 5.92 0.00 9.27 
18.5
8 9.27 18.58 
X Variable 1 1.15 0.50 2.32 0.02 0.17 2.14 0.17 2.14 
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Figure 3.1:  Regression analysis between GHI and Freedom House Score for Group D. 135 
observations yielded low correlation values with a regression analysis statistic of the x-value 
(FHS) that measured statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval. 
Regression Analysis for Group D of PSS determining GHI (Figure 3.2): 
SUMMARY 
OUTPUT        
         
Regression 
Statistics        
Multiple R 0.26        
R Square 0.07        
Adjusted R 
Square 0.06        
Standard 
Error 8.93        
Observations 108.00        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F    
Regression 1.00 607.06 607.06 7.62 0.01    
Residual 106.00 8446.73 79.69      
Total 107.00 9053.79          
         
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error T Stat 
P-







Intercept 16.10 1.11 14.49 0.00 13.90 18.30 13.90 18.30 
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X Variable 1 -3.18 1.15 -2.76 0.01 -5.47 -0.90 -5.47 -0.90 
Figure 3.3: Regression Analysis of Group D between PSS and GHI. 108 observations yielded 
low correlation values with a regression analysis statistic of the x-value (PSS) that measured 
statistically significant at the 95% and 99% confidence intervals 
Regression Analysis for Group D of GDP per Capita determining GHI (Figure 3.4): 
Linear Regression 
        
Regression Statistics           
R 0.62       
R Square 0.38       
Adjusted R 
Square 0.38       
Standard Error 7.68       
Total Number Of 
Cases 126.00       
38.8 = 24.3712 - 0.0038 * 292 
                
ANOVA               
  d.f. SS MS F 
p-
level     




9 0.00   
Residual 124.00 7318.96 59.02     
Total 125.00 11810.25           


















292 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -8.72 
0.0
0 Yes 
T (2%) 2.36             
LCL - Lower value of a reliable interval (LCL)     
UCL - Upper value of a reliable interval (UCL)     
Figure 3.4: Regression analysis for Group D between GHI and GDP per Capita. 126 
observations yielded high correlation values with a regression analysis statistic of the x-value 
(GDP per capita) that measured statistically significant at the 95% and 99% confidence 
intervals. 
Below is a summary depicting the data regarding correlation coefficients and the 
corresponding p-value of the regression models (Figure 3.5):  
 
Data Set 









Group A -0.23 0.23 0.3 0.11 0.01 0.73 -0.58 0**
Group B -0.46 0.01** 0.15 0.44 -0.14 0.5** -0.62 0**
Group C -0.13 0.05** 0.28 0** -0.44 0.03** -0.61 0**








Figure 3.5:  Summary of correlation coefficients and p-values associated with each group and 
the regression analysis between GHI and various possibly determinative independent 
variables 
GMO deregulation ( the ITS): 
Figure 3.3 above summarizes data collected and analyzed for the four groups.  Isolating 
GMO deregulation (GHI vs Time), GMO liberalization appears to have a weak to low 
moderate negative correlation for all four groups.  Time alone appears to show no significant 
correlation for Group A states, while Group B, C, and D appear to show statistically 
significant change despite the weak correlation.  Group B appears to have the strongest 
negative correlation between time and GHI. 
Group A – GHI over Time:    
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Figure 3.4: Scatter plot and trend line for Group A of GHI from 1990 to 2012 measurements. 
Countries that have banned GMOs for cultivation and import show mild to steady progress 
toward a lower GHI from 1990 to 2012.  Turkey has been at or below 5 GHI for the duration 
of study, indicating virtual complete elimination of hunger within the country.  Algeria 
achieved this by 2000.  At a p-value of .23, time alone does not appear to be a causative 
factor for the steady improvement of these countries.   



















Figure 3.5: Scatter plot and trend line for Group B of GHI from 1990 to 2012 measurements. 
Countries that have banned GMO cultivation, but their laws allow products that crops 
containing GMOs show a relatively clear pattern of lowering GHI over time.  This negative 
correlation is moderately strong, with statistically significant p-value of .01. It appears from 
this result that it is no accident that countries accepting GMO imports are experiencing 
lowering GHI over time. Most countries in this group experience the greatest downward 
trend after 1996, when the first GMO crops were introduced for commercial production.  

















Figure 3.6: Scatter plot and trend line for Group C of GHI from 1990 to 2012 measurements. 
Countries that have accepted GMOs for cultivation and importation have experienced a 
steady decrease in GHI.  Argentina and Chile have remain steady at or below 5, indicating 
virtual elimination of hunger in the country.  After 1996, countries such as Honduras and 
Colombia experienced the most dramatic falls in their GHI.  At a p-value of 0.05, we can be 
95% confident that the pattern observed is due to open GMO acceptance.   



















Figure 3.7: Scatter plot and trend line for Group D of GHI from 1990 to 2012 measurements. 
The 27 randomly selected countries show a low-moderate correlation of decreased GHI due 
to time. African countries, such as Mozambique and Ethiopia, showed the most apparent 
changes after 1996.  Mozambique currently accepts GM imports.  Ethiopia has adopted a 
stringent regulatory practice since 2009, and it is unclear how this has affected imports and of 
GM products. A p-value of 0.00 indicates that we can infer that time alone may have 
statistically significant role in the gradual decline in the GHI of randomly selected countries.  
Freedom House Score: 
Similar to the ITS, Group A, B, and C have weak correlation coefficients.  Although there 
appears to be a weak correlation between GHI and civil liberties, it is the strongest 
correlating factor for countries in Group A for this study.  Furthermore, it is the statistically 
most significant factor for Group A and C countries.   



















Figure 3.8: Scatter plot and trend line for Group A of GHI and FHS over the period of 1990 
to 2012 measurements. 
For Group A, there was a slightly stronger correlation between GHI and Freedom House 
Score (FHS) than between GHI and Time.  The p-value, although statistically insignificant, 
shows the most significance among all categories for Group A.  The graph shows a slight 
positive correlation between worsening levels of political/civil liberties and a worsening of 
hunger levels in the country.    





















Figure 3.9: Scatter plot and trend line for Group B of GHI and FHS over the period of 1990 
to 2012 measurements 
Countries explicitly accepting GMO imports while banning GMO cultivation appear to have 
a very weak correlation coefficient of 0.15, indicating a weak to non-existent relationship 
between a decrease in civil liberties and increased hunger.  A p-value of 0.44 indicates 
further the statistical insignificance of this correlation.  

















Figure 4.0: Scatter plot and trend line for Group C of GHI and FHS over the period of 1990 
to 2012 measurements 
Countries that have accepted GMOs for cultivation and importation moderately correlate an 
increase in a state’s hunger with a decrease in civil liberties.  A t-test revealed statistical 
significance at the 99% confidence interval.   





















Figure 4.1: Scatter plot and trend line for Group D of GHI and FHS over the period of 1990 
to 2012 measurements 
For the random sample, there is a low-moderate correlation between the increase in a state’s 
GHI and a decrease in political right and civil liberties.  The p-value of the regression 
showed statistical significance at the 95% and 99% confidence interval.   
Political Stability Score: 
The data show weak and low-moderate scores for all three groups.  PSS is also the strongest 
correlating factor to GHI for Group C, with a corresponding statistical significance at the 
95% confidence interval.  



















Figure 4.2: Scatter plot and trend line for Group A of GHI and PSS over the period of 1995 
to 2012 measurements. 
For Group A, the Political Stability Score (PSS) shows the weakest correlation for countries 
that have banned GMO imports and cultivation.  PSS also showed the most statistically 
insignificant p-value of 0.73. As indicated by the graph, countries such as Turkey 
experienced low hunger despite relative political instability while countries such as Benin 
experienced a high GHI despite relatively high political stability.  





















Figure 4.3: Scatter plot and trend line for Group B of GHI and PSS over the period of 1995 to 
2012 measurements 
Countries that have accepted importation while banning the cultivation of GMOs have shown 
a weak negative of decreased hunger relative to increased political stability.  A p-value of 
0.50 indicates statistical insignificance with this regression.  

















Figure 4.4: Scatter plot and trend line for Group C of GHI and PSS over the period of 1995 to 
2012 measurements 
Countries that have accepted GMOs show a moderate negative correlation between greater 
political stability and a lowered GHI.  A regression analysis shows statistical significance of 
this regression model at the 95% confidence interval.  





















Figure 4.5: Scatter plot and trend line for Group D of GHI and PSS over the period of 1995 
to 2012 measurements 
The randomly selected group of 29 countries showed low-moderate negative correlation 
between the Political Stability Score (PSS) and GHI.  The regression model, however, is 
found statistically significant at the 99% confidence interval.   
GDP per capita: 





















Figure 4.6: Scatter plot and trend line for Group A of GHI and GDP per Capita over the 
period of 1990 to 2012 measurements 
Group A showed high-moderate negative correlation between GDP per capita and GHI.  A 
regression analysis of the data showed that this correlation is significant at the 99% 























Figure 4.7: Scatter plot and trend line for Group B of GHI and GDP per Capita over the 
period of 1990 to 2012 measurements 
Group B showed a high moderate negative correlation of -0.62.  A regression analysis of 
these data showed that this regression is statistically significant at the 99% confidence 
interval.  



















Figure 4.8: Scatter plot and trend line for Group C of GHI and GDP per Capita over the 
period of 1990 to 2012 measurements 
Group C showed a high-moderate negative correlation between GDP and GHI of -0.61.  A 






















Figure 4.9: Scatter plot and trend line for Group D of GHI and GDP per Capita over the 
period of 1990 to 2012 measurements 
Group D showed a high moderate negative correlation coefficient of -0.62. A regression 
























Chapter 4: Results of Qualitative Analysis 
Group A: 
From the period of 1990 to 2012, the countries that currently ban genetically modified food 
for cultivation and importation have undergone various events that may correlate well with 
fluctuations in GHI. Historical, political, economic, and ecological were the main factors 
considered for analysis and appear to cover all possibilities.  
Algeria: The oil shock of the late 1980s is seen as the main culprit contributing to a slowing 
of growth until 2001 (Tiliouine, Cummins, and Davern 2006). Furthermore, between 1991 
and 2002, violence between Islamist armed groups and the national army had led to the lost 
of lives as well as social and political stability.  The environment had calmed down slightly 
due to many armed groups being granted amnesty since 2000, but by then, 30% of the labor 
force was unemployed and approximately one-third of the population lived in poverty. 
Meanwhile, average consumer prices had risen by about 85%.  Added to this, although there 
had been many known epidemics through Algeria each year, there has been substantial 
improvement since 2001 due to increasing oil prices.  
Research through Algeria’s perspective may support the idea that conflict – internal and 
territorial – is the main cause for hunger and fluctuations in food security.  Violence within a 
country can hamper a country’s ability to prioritize food production and build a productive 
economy (Cohen and Pinstrup-Andersen 1999).  The quantitative data collected show some 
congruencies with the literature analysis.  Economically, one can observe a severe drop in 
GDP per capita during the most severe periods of conflict from 1990 to 1995.  Afterward, 
there is minor improvement until 2005, when GDP per Capita finally exceeds the figures in 
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1990.  2005 PSS is also seen as noticeably improved by 2005, although increases in violent 
protests in several cities toward 2011 may have contributed to a worsened PSS score. There 
is also a noticeable parallel between the FHS data and historical analysis, where political 
freedoms and civil rights significantly declined from 1990 to 1995 as the violence within the 
country escalated.  Afterward, there was some mild relief, but violent protests keep Algeria 
in a defacto state of emergency.  The GHI of Algeria fluctuates in concordance with the 
details of Algeria’s historical conflicts and the economic repercussions of an oil crisis and 
war.  Food security showed the most improvement since after 2000, when most of the armed 
conflict had declined.  
Angola: 
Several scholars would argue that countries such as Angola experience some of the most 
severe cases of food crises because of their prolonged violent conflicts (Scanlan and Jenkins 
2001).  Angola had experienced a civil war until 2002, whereby most of its economic 
reconstruction has been propelled by the oil trade (Soares de Oliveira 2011).The most 
noticeable decline in GHI is after 2000, from 31.6 in 2000 to 22.7 in 2005.  Angola has also 
become noticeably most stable during this period, from a PSS score of -2.09 in 2000 to -0.89 
in 2005 and -0.38 in 2012.  The country has also experienced a rather significant jump in 
GDP per capita since 2000, from $656 in 2000 to $1707 in 2005 and $5539 in 2012.   
Benin: 
Elucidated by the GHI model, Benin has enjoyed a gradual decline in its GHI since 1990, 
from 22.5 in 1990 to 13.3 in 2012.  This trend has occurred despite declining PSS and 
fluctuated GDP per capita, but improved FHS since 1990 when the official constitution of 
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Benin had been completed (Dossou-Yovo 1999). Benin, however, is heavily dependent on 
agricultural yields for its economy.  Varying crop prices, despite steadily increasing yields, 
can help to explain Benin’s irregular GDP per capita growth rate  - especially for cotton 
exports (Baffes 2005).  
Turkey:   
Turkey has remained without a significant food security problem since the beginning of the 
GHI study.  FHS and PSS have both fluctuated throughout this time period.  Meanwhile, 
GDP per capita increased in Turkey faster and by more than any other country in Group A.  
With access to EU markets, Turkey’s economy is heavily based on the production of motor 
vehicles and consumer electronics (Banalieva and Sarathy 2011).   
Zambia:  
Fluctuating minimally, Zambia’s GHI has remained quite high from 1990 to 2012.  GHI was 
at its worst in 2000, steadily climbing from 24.9 to 26.3, before dropping to 24.1 by 2012. 
According to some scholars, the primary obstacle between Zambia and its food security is 
geography.  As a land-locked country, Zambia has access to less trade partners and options.  
Trading profits are also limited due tariffs and other fluctuating trade policies by neighboring 
transit countries.  The extra costs associated with a landlocked country ultimately passes to 
the consumer, where food prices can become too high to afford (Naylor and Falcon 2010). 
Meanwhile, other scholars suggest that, since 1995, the local food economy has been 
hampered by the introduction of big chain supermarkets.  Although Shoprite sources up to 80 
percent of its fresh fruit and vegetables from Zambia, they are normally sources from large-
scale commercial farms.  Furthermore, processed foods are regularly sourced from South 
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Africa and other countries.  As a result, many local markets and producers have been 
displaced (Crush and Frayne 2011). Zambia’s drop in GDP per capita until after 2000 
correlates well with Zambia’s dependence on the copper trade.  After 2002, increased 
investment, privatization, and increased consumption from countries such as China were 
factors that reportedly boosted the Zambian economy significantly(Carmody and Hampwaye 
2010). Throughout the period of the study, Zambia has also reported significant increases in 
PSS, while FHS has remained variable.  It was after 2000, however, that Zambia began on a 
trajectory that led to its current lowest GHI of 24.1 
Zimbabwe: 
Since 1990, Zimbabwe’s FHS progressively worsened, from 5 to 6 over the period of the 
study.  Political stability has also worsened, reaching its peak instability at the 2000 
measurement of -1.42 before reaching a milder instability level -0.79. GDP per capita also 
reached its worst level by 2005, at $453, before shooting up to a high of $909 by 2012. The 
economic and political decline of the country prior to 2005 can be partially attributed to the 
economic drain in Zimbabwe’s involvement in the war in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo.  It was also during this period that there was massive overhaul and redistribution of 
territory owned by the White population.  Production had sharply declined, inflation had 
risen by as high as 11.2 million percent, and unemployment was as high as 80 percent. The 
boost in GDP per Capita, improvement in political stability, and decrease in GHI can be due 
to a variety of factors. The 2006 discovery of the Marange diamond fields contributed 
significantly to the economy. Furthermore, Zimplats, the country’s largest platinum 
company, had invested significantly in expansion since 2009. Furthermore, efforts by 
International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) had invested 
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heavily in maintaining sustainable farming practices in Zimbabwe, reportedly preventing soil 
disturbances and increasing yields by as much as 100 percent between 2005 and 2011 
(Mazvimavi et al. 2012).  
Group B: Countries that do not cultivate GMO maize, but allow products containing GMO 
maize to be imported.  
Ecuador:  
Ecuador shows minor fluctuations from improvement across all variables from 1990 to 2012.  
The slight increase in GHI could be attributed to various causes and correlations.  The 
increase in GHI correlates with a sudden drop in GDP per capita, a slight increase in FHS 
(the country became slightly less free), but also a slight improvement in political stability.  
The significant drop in GDP per capita may have been due to the banking crisis in the late 
1990s, when Ecuador ultimately had to give up its sovereign currency, the sucre, in exchange 
for the US dollar (Jameson 2003).  
El Salvador: 
The data show that El Salvador showed a general trend of steadily improving GHI until the 
period between 2005 and 2012.  During that time, there were no apparent changes in FHS, an 
improvement in political stability, and an improvement in GDP per capita.  With no obvious 
correlation, other possible links must be explored. Scholars have actually pointed to the rapid 
and under-regulated adoption of liberalism as the culprit, making the country economically 
more unequal and expensive while less free (Wade 2008).  
Guatemala: 
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The data show that Guatemala’s GHI steadily worsened from the beginning of the study until 
the 2012 results.  Accounting for this is not apparent through the measured potential 
indicatives.  GDP per capita consistently increased from $860 in 1990 to $3341 in 2012. 
Furthermore, according to studies such as Naylor and Falcon, price increases during notable 
staple crop hikes, such as in 2008, did not significantly impact domestic prices in Guatemala 
(2010).  Nevertheless, the study concludes that Guatemalans have been particularly 
disadvantaged by crop prices and per capita expenses. Large portions of the Guatemalan 
population, especially the poor, are dependent on the sale of their crops in local markets, but 
crop prices and competition still push them to be net consumers.  This results in a widening 
gap between the rich and poor, especially between small farmers and large landowners. 
Although GDP per capita may have increased throughout the years of this study, income 
inequality as measured by the GINI index has remained high and above average compared to 
neighboring countries (Holden and Jacobson 2008).  
Nicaragua: 
Nicaragua showed fairly significantly improvement in GHI by comparison to the beginning 
of the study, and without fluctuations from this trend.  From 1990 to 2012, Nicaragua’s GHI 
went from 24.1 to 9.5, with no upward fluctuations. FHS remained between 3 and 4.5, 
fluctuating throughout the study’s durations, while PSS showed improvement in 2012 
compared to 1996, but with fluctuations between worsening and improvement between those 
years.  Meanwhile, GDP per capita had increased consistently throughout the study, most 
significantly between 1990 through 1995 and 2005 through 2012.  Journal records are rather 
vague, besides pointing to increased foreign investment, creating a large tourist industry, and 
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the heavy use of foreign food aid due to Nicaragua’s inability of supply most of its own food 
needs (Clapp 2005). 
Peru: 
Peru’s GHI dropped from 16.3 in 1990 to 5.5 in the 2012 analysis, indicating that Peru is 
close to having virtually insignificant hunger issues.  This improvement proceeded with no 
fluctuations in the trend. During this study, Peru had fluctuated in its FHS trend, become less 
free from 1990 to 1995, but improving from 1995 to 2000 before settling at 2.5.  Meanwhile, 
PSS showed instability, but a generally improving trend since 1996.  Furthermore, it was 
between 1995 and 2000 that GDP per capita lowered from $2,132 to $1,949 after an upward 
trend from $1,149 in 1990.  Peru is relatively resistant to GMO acceptance, but has taken 
steps to allow Peruvians to use GMOs for export (Nolte and Beillard 2014). Furthermore, the 
Asian crisis of 1997 is claimed as the primary culprit for Peru’s sudden downward trend in 
economy prosperity, but it apparently did not affect GHI (Khan 2004). 
Venezuela:  
Venezuela has experienced a trend toward virtually no hunger at a GHI of 5 by 2012.  During 
this time, there was uninterrupted increase in GDP per capita for each measured year, from 
$2,382 in 1990 to $12,729 in 2012.  FHS was measured as gradually trending toward less 
free, from 2 in 1990 to 5 in 2012.  Meanwhile, PSS had fluctuated, but generally measured as 
moderately or very unstable. The growth in Venezuela has been largely contributed to the 
discovery of the world’s largest oil reserves. Since 1999, Chavez was known to use oil 
revenues to foster food security initiatives throughout the country (Clark 2010).  
Argentina: 
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Since the beginning of this study, Argentina has showed no change in overall GHI  - it has 
remained an insignificant issue.  And beside a small fluctuation in 1995, Argentina has 
remained and trended more toward being a freer country according to its FHS. According to 
PSS, the country measures on the more stable (positive) end overall, with only a slight trend 
toward instability 2005.  GDP per capita also dipped sometime between 2000 and 2005, from 
$9,329 to $5,768, before shooting up to $14,680 by 2012. Although it did not seem to affect 
food security, this drop in per capita GDP can be accounted to the December 2001 default of 
Argentina’s $93 billion debt to the United States, which resulted in a deep recession and 
drastic decline in GDP (Arellano 2008).  
Brazil: 
Brazil showed a steady decline in GHI from 1990 to 2012, from 8.7 to 5, signifying the 
virtual elimination of hunger as a serious issue in Brazil.  Brazil has remain relatively 
considered free by its FHS, but fluctuated slightly from 2.5 in 1990 to 3 in 1995 and 2000 
before returning to 2 until the end of the study.  Meanwhile, Brazil showed variable changes 
in PSS, with peak instability at 1996 with -0.25 and peak stability at 2000 with 0.18.  GDP 
per capita also declined between 1995 and 2000, reaching a low of $3,694 in 2000 before 
climbing to a high of $11,320 by 2012.  Agriculturally, Brazil primarily trades with the 
United States in order to supplement for any local shortfalls due to weather or other 
environmental issues. Nevertheless, it has grown to become a major producer and exporter of 
products such as soybeans, cotton, sugar, cocoa, coffee, frozen concentrated orange juice, 
beef, poultry, pork, tobacco, hides and skins, fruits, and nuts, and fish.  As a source of food 
aid from several lesser developed countries, Brazil is expected to remain highly food secure 
in the near future.  Its food aid exports are non-GMO, but Brazil is currently a leading 
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exporter of biotech soybeans, corn, and cotton (Silva and O’Kray 2013). The economic 
downturns, along with political stability and civil liberty variations, occurred irrespective of 
the improvement in agriculture, and are regularly accounted for by the severe effects of 
several external circumstances such as the East Asian financial crisis and the Russian default 
in 1998 (Akcay and Zenginovuz 2001).  
Chile: 
Since the beginning of the study, Chile has remained consistently with a GHI reading 
equivalent to insignificant hunger issues – a score of 5.  During this period, Chile has also 
remained a country considered free, moving from an FHS of 2 to 1 after 2000.  Furthermore, 
PSS has remained positive, fluctuating moderately between a high of 0.85 in 2005 and a low 
of 0.35 in 2012. Meanwhile, Chile has also remained steadily increasing in GDP per capita 
since the beginning of the study, from $1,209 to $15,245 in 2012.  Chile has been 
propagating GM crops for more than a decade, and can currently produce transgenic crops 
for export, including sugar beets, corn, alfalfa, and soybean (Ramirez 2013).  With all 
possible indicators remaining consistent, it is not easy to predict the cause of Chile’s food 
security success. 
Colombia: 
Various indicators imply considerable instability throughout the country.  GHI, however, has 
shown relatively consistent improvement since the beginning of the study.  Other than a 
minor spike from 6.8 to 6.9 between 2000 and 2005, there was an overall drop from 10.4 to 
5.9.  According to the Freedom House Score, the country has been partially free for the 
duration of the study, fluctuating from a low of 3 in 2005 to a high of 4 in 1995 and 2000.  
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Political instability happened to peak in 2005, as the country was considered most free. 2005 
was also the year measured when Colombia’s GDP per capita appeared to have recovered 
from a minor slump in GDP per capita growth in the previous year. Instability in the country 
has been long attributed to the FARC.  Until approximately around 2000, the US has 
inadvertently strengthened the FARC by destroying its political and military rivals in the 
region (Peceny and Durnan 2006).  The strengthening of the FARC contributed to negative 
economic and political consequences (Rocha Garcia 2003). Although Colombia has an 
abundance of arable land, most of less appropriate land is dedicated to food production. This 
has resulted in Colombia being highly reliant on food imports (Richani 2012).  It is also a 
limited food aid recipient from the United States.  Meanwhile, Colombia has been producing 
GM corn since 2007, along with GM cotton and carnations (Gilbert and Uribe 2014). 
Honduras: 
Honduras has experienced consistent and gradual improvement in GHI, from a high of 14.2 
in 1990 to 7.9 in 2012. GDP per capita also shows consistent improvement, from $622 in 
1990 to $2,339 in 2012.  Meanwhile, other possible indicators are inconsistent during the 
period of measurements.  PSS experienced its best level at -0.18 in 2000, worsening to -0.65 
in 2005 before showing some slight improvement in 2012 at -0.40.  FHS gradually worsened, 
from 2.5 in 1990 to 4 in 2012.  Honduras happens to be the only Central Americans country 
that allows the commercial production and field trials of biotech crops, including bananas, 
corn, soybeans, and rice. Commercial population of corn is highly regulated, but allowed in 
specific areas (Gomez 2012). To combat remaining hunger issues, food aid programs have 
been established in Honduras for several years (Shaw, Crawshaw, and Fortier 1994).  
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Uruguay:   
Uruguay has experienced virtually no significant hunger issues since the 1995 GHI analysis.  
Meanwhile, its FHS indicates that despite a slight increase from 1.5 to 2 (Free), Uruguay has 
remained “Free” according this measurement.  Political Stability Score has also remained 
positive, from a low of .53 in 1996, it fluctuated from a high of 0.85 in 2000 before lowering 
to 0.71 by 2012.  Meanwhile, GDP per capita dipped between 2000 at $6,873 to $5,222 in 
2005.  This can be largely attributed to a spillover effect after the economic downtown of 
Uruguay’s neighboring countries, especially Argentina (Meyer 2010 “Uruguay: Political and 
Economic Conditions and U.S. Relations”). None of these indicator seemed to have made a 
significant impact on the overall. Highly dependent on agriculture, around 10 percent of 
Uruguay’s GDP is dependent on agricultural trade, with 67 percent of the country’s total 
exports in agricultural products.  Uruguay has been commercially producing biotech corn in 










Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion 
Group A: 
 Countries that have banned GMO cultivation and imports are showing a low-
moderate trend of decreased hunger within their states over time.  Among all possible 
correlating factors, GDP per capita was the most statistically significant.  The factor with the 
strongest correlating trend was the GDP per capita, followed by Freedom House Score.  The 
factor or factors that truly help these countries to be become more food secure appears to be 
the interaction of the studied factors and others left for future research. One can conclude that 
food security does not depend on GMO acceptance, but will vary based on the specific 
historical needs of the states, as seen through the qualitative analysis.  Being a “free” state 
may yield some indirect consequences that benefit food security, while GDP per capita is a 
clear indicator of overall wealth and the ability to purchase food. 
Algeria has relied heavily on humanitarian aid, especially for its Sahrawi refugees, 
and that may contribute to its extremely low GHI despite being an arid and harsh climate for 
agriculture. Since independence, Algeria has suffered a complex array of issues that have 
prevented it from stabilizing its food supply. The primary reason, however, has been noted 
since the 1970s as government neglect and faulty government policies regarding agriculture. 
Some scholars would suggest, however, that the 1986 oil shock is responsible for 
destabilizing the country’s clear growth trajectory (Tiliouine and Cummins 2006). As a 
country dependent on food imports, debt increased as the state’s income decreased and 
overall growth has been minimal since that time.  Other nuisances have affected agricultural 
output as well, such a large locust infestation in 2004 that upset agricultural output (Malkawi 
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2006). It is unclear if GMO crop approval may have led to the avoidance of such an 
infestation, but scholars such as Malkawi have indicated the possibility.   
  Angola, as seen on the graph (GHI Over Time), experiences the most dramatic fall 
in GHI after 2000. It is well known that the civil insurgency within Angola by militant group 
UNITA continued until 2002, when its leader passed away. This time period also coincides 
with a rather dramatic improvement in Angola’s Political Stability Score (PSS) and a subtle 
improvement in its Freedom House Score (FHS) after 2000. A generally unstable political 
climate has been accused as the main culprit for lacking progress in food security, even when 
effort is made to fulfill liberal ideals such as the privatization of the agricultural sector 
(Munslow 1999). 
Benin is a country that has shown gradual improvement in not only GHI, but also on 
all independent variables that may be correlated with greater food security. Studies have 
shown, however, that the greatest causal factor to hunger in the state may be climate 
fluctuation (Paeth et al 2008).  Crops that are typically grown in the country appear to be 
especially sensitive to factors such as rainfall. The cause of increased food security in the 
area, according to one study, is the increased production of 2 
Zambia’s fluctuation, however, may be due to several historical factors that cannot be 
so readily deciphered.  An economy based on copper mining, Zambia suffered greatly into 
the late 1990s as production fell due to lack of investment and falling copper prices. The 
economy did not report growth until 2007, shortly after a reported drop in GHI.  Economic 
strength and changes in economic policy, such as austerity measures and conditionality 
agreements, are factors worthy of consideration in future studies of food security. A 
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measurable factor such as GDP is suggested for future quantitative analysis, especially for 
countries that have banned the cultivation and importation of GMOs.  
Group B:  
 Statistical significance is observed for regression models when observing GHI over 
time, GDP per capita, and GHI over varying periods of political stability (Political Stability 
Score). Although there is a relatively weak negative correlation between political stability 
and decreased hunger, this is, as seen with Group B, a possibly significant factor for specific 
countries within the group.  Guatemala’s mild jump in GHI after 1995 corresponds neither 
with increased political instability nor decreased civil/political freedoms.  Furthermore, due 
to increased political stability after the 1996 peace accords ending the civil war, the country 
saw an increase in economic growth due to increased foreign investment, increased tourism, 
and receiving remittances from Guatemalans that had fled to the United States during the 
war. Possibly future studies can seek to clarify the complex consequences (positive and 
negative) of economic growth, such as income disparities.  A possible statistic that may help 
in this study would be the GINI index.  
Group C:  
 GDP per capita, political stability and civil/political freedoms seem to be greater 
correlative factors toward decreased hunger than the factor of GMO deregulation. The graph, 
GHI Over Time, for Group C shows a weaker negative correlation, indicating that isolating 
the factors of GMO acceptance for cultivation and import does less to ensure a state’s food 
security than civil freedoms or political stability.  The graph indicating PSS shows moderate 
correlation and statistical significance, while it is also visibly apparent that GMO cultivating 
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and importing countries enjoy greater food security when their states were more stable and 
free.  Colombia, for example, fluctuated in food security as the country experienced varying 
political stability from 2000 to 2012.  Observations like this are less apparent for countries 
such as Honduras, which has experienced fluctuating degrees of political stability and civil 
freedoms for the duration of the study, but has experienced significant improvements in food 
security from the beginning to the end of this study.  The acceptances of GMO crops may 
have played a role for this individual country, but it is advised that future studies investigate 
other factors further such as a economic growth, income per capita, and even the acceptance 
of food aid.  
Group D: 
 It is apparent from the Initial Test Series (ITS) that the random sample has 
experienced decreased overall hunger in their respective countries over time. Furthermore, 
the correlation between GHI and GDP per capita is fairly strong. The factors of PSS and FHS 
are interestingly similar – a low-moderate correlation.  Both regression models were 
statistically significant. There is a possibility that that PSS and FHS were significant 
contributors to food security for specific countries, while the specific reason for others may 
vary similarly to the countries in the other groups. Furthermore, PSS and FHS may two of 
several variables that contribute to security. Ultimately, relative to the objective of this study, 
food security is not clearly tied to GMO acceptance, but a complex interplay of economic, 
political, international and civil actions specific to each state. 
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 There is no indication within this study that GMO acceptance is a significant causal 
factor toward food security.  The implications of this study can counter claims from 
policymakers and corporations that GMOs are solving world hunger.  Thus far, after almost 
two decades of GM-crop commercialization, it is unfair to state that GMOs have or will 
significantly contribute to food security.  Although Group B appears to show moderate 
significant correlation between decreased GHI and GMO deregulation, the results are 
confounded by an inconsistent pattern between Group A, Group C, and Group D.  Political 
Stability seemed to have been a stronger factor toward food security for Group C states that 
have deregulated corn for cultivation and imports.  Although no statistically significant 
correlations were found for Group A states, increased civil liberties showed the strongest 
correlation toward food security, suggesting the need for an increased sample size or the 
testing of other variables.  The overall results suggest there is an interaction effect of a 
variety of variables and, regardless of status in GMO regulation, there is a general decrease 
in hunger for all states in this study. 
 Previous research has compiled maize field trials.  Such research has concluded that 
GM hybrid corn does contribute to increased yield, but they admittedly do not provide 
reliable estimates of their contribution to yield over time. Experimental trials also cannot 
account for environmental changes, the possibility of infestation mutations, and the long-
term effects of GM crops on a large farm (Nolan and Santos 2012). 
 Legally, the WTO outlaws the banning of food imports unless there is scientifically 
established evidence of a product or crop to be hazardous to the health of citizens.  Sufficient 
scientific uncertainty appears to be the only factor that may prevent the WTO from 
disallowing a ban of GM crops, as soon by WTO decisions to outlaw bans of US beef to the 
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EU.  The reason for this decision was reportedly due to the inconclusiveness of safety 
research on artificial beef hormones (Brom 2004).  The EU and US have apparent differences 
in their definition of safety, as with their definition of security.  Unfortunately, due to the 
nature of states and businesses to financially support research that may produce specific 
results, academia can hardly be seen as an independent referee in the arena of biosafety 
(Stone 2010). 
 To combat this legal framework established by the WTO and backed by GMO 
producers, the Cartagena Protocol upholds the precautionary principle as a tool to override 
the necessity for unequivocal scientific evidence.  The Protocol declares that any level of 
scientific uncertainty can warrant regulatory practices until unequivocal scientific results 
have answered any questions concerns safety (Levidow 2001).  Furthermore, the empirical 
quantitative analysis of this paper can also conclude that claims by the US against the EU for 
exacerbating global hunger through their precautionary measures is unfounded (Clapp 2005).  
LDCs are naturally caught on the fringes when a conflict occurs between economic giants, as 
they will rationally preserve their own power, even if it may cost them short-term gains such 
as food aid (Schneider and Urpelainen 2013).   
 Based on this research, it is safe to conclude that GM crops pose no more of a 
significant contribution to food security as do other, less controversial factors.  LDCs as well 
as EU countries may be advised to focus on fortifying their political stability and ensuring a 
safe economically and politically free foundation for the agricultural sector and other 
businesses to flourish.  GM-producing states will continue to push their agenda to expand 
their market, irrespective of biosafety claims, in order to satisfy the realist agenda to shift the 
status-quo of biotechnological hegemony in their favor.  Considering case studies such as 
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that of Oaxaca, there is a burden for GMO-laden countries, intentionally or unintentionally, 
to be responsible for the loyalties consistent with IPR protection of GMO usage (McAfee 
2003).  Food security is, thus, understandably, an uncertainty while bio-hegemony is a clear 
goal of producer states. If IPR over GM crops are perceived to obstruct food sovereignty, 
states will have a consistent reason to utilize the precautionary principle of the Cartagena 
Protocol until sufficient tracking and accountability mechanisms are introduced. 
Evidence suggests, however, that producer states would be wise to forgo claims that 
GMO will ensure food security and cure world hunger (Clives 2012).  They may have a 
strong case to keep borders open to GM products, under WTO regulations, but EU member 
states can be relatively sure that lower government bodies and consumers will forestall or 
eliminate the possibility of GM-crop acceptance in the near future (Kurzer and Cooper 2007).   
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